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Discussion after the Speeches of Clifford L. Whitehill
and Katharine F. Braid
QUESTION, Mr. Miller: What risk might corporate counsel be taking
in introducing ADR into a corporate culture that has not previously ex-
perienced ADR?
COMMENT, Mr. Whitehill: It is difficult to introduce ADR into a cul-
ture that has not practiced it before. Just as in a law firm, corporate
counsel comes from law schools and learned the case system which
originated from litigation. If a review was done of the number of liti-
gated cases in which corporations were extremely dissatisfied with the
results because they felt there had not been a fair and complete hearing,
perhaps because the facts were somehow misconstrued by the jury, or
because the experts were not understood, this study would go a long way
in getting ADR introduced into the corporate culture. With ADR, at
least the corportion can be satisifed, win or lose, that the determination
was made by experts.
Marguerite Millhauser, who is an expert in this area, feels one prob-
lem with introducing ADR into the corporate culture is that typically it
is a manager of a division that gets into a dispute with multi-millions of
dollars at stake. The manager figures that his normal term in the partic-
ular position is three or four years. He does not want to risk receiving a
speedy but bad decision via ADR. Therefore, he sues because he knows
it will be ten years before the final appeal and he will be someplace else
by then.
One of the things that General Mills does to get a different prospec-
tive on the immediacy of the question is to require the law department to
examine these disputes, ideally on a basis that is not prejudicial, to deter-
mine the exposure. For instance, if the exposure is estimated to be $3
million, the law department tells the party to the dispute, "You are going
to have to reserve $3 million this year against your P and L." And the
party responds, "I don't believe that. Is there some quicker way to get
this thing resolved?" Immediately there is attention paid to the problem.
QUESTION, Mr. Reifsnyder: Is there ever any reluctance to propose
ADR to the other side of a dispute because, in effect, it is seeking a
concession?
ANSWER, Mr. Whitehill: Absolutely. There are two aspects to that
concern. One is, do you owe them something? The other involves the
question of ADR, and is brought up after the dispute has crystalized.
Generally, one party will perceive an advantage in going to ADR and
the other party will perceive an advantage in going to litigation. That is
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one of the reasons why the courts have started mandating certain types of
ADR, because one party wants to go one way and one party wants to go
the other.
One of the ways this reluctance may be partially overcome is by
requiring an ADR clause in the agreement. General Mills literally will
not sign a contract without an ADR clause in it. If you do not want to
do business with us on that basis, then you do not do business with us.
Under the Committee for Public Resources there is what is called a cor-
porate pledge. At least 1,000 major corporations have taken the pledge,
which states that when a dispute arises, the corporation will endeavor to
find methods of ADR in settling the dispute.
QUESTION, Professor King: Is there a size limitation on these types of
disputes? Are there any exceptions to this approach?
ANSWER, Mr. Whitehill: Other than determining what is subject to
ADR, none whatsoever. An interesting question that General Mills has
struggled with concerns attempting to bifurcate an agreement beforehand
into which issues might be litigated and which issues might be suitable
for an ADR resolution. Trying to pre-determine what is a question of
law and what is a question of fact, or how they interrelate, is difficult. A
lot of times you have to decide the questions of fact before you can get to
the questions of law. What General Mills does is to try and structure an
ADR or an arbitration clause so that whatever question is presented is
ideally determined by experts in the field, whether it is a question of engi-
neering, accounting or law.
COMMENT, Ms. Braid: It varies considerably with the type of agree-
ment in question. For instance, you may know that Canadian Pacific has
a new tunnel through the Rocky Mountains. There were a lot of con-
struction contracts involved with the tunnel. These contracts involved
the specifications, or what work was to be done, and anything which was
essentially an engineering question. The arbitration clause basically said
that disputes arising under sections X, Y and Z of the agreement will be
submitted to arbitration. The arbitration will be conducted under the
rules of arbitration in the Province of British Columbia, and will be dealt
with in a specified way.
The other clauses in the contract, such as a basic misrepresentation
clause, which said the contractor is not relying on any information about
the work or the nature of the work or the site provided by the owner, but
relies on his own information, were not subject to arbitration. I would
not want to take that clause to arbitration. I have already taken it to the
Supreme Court of Canada, but I would not want to take it to arbitration
because you cannot have the contractor ielying on what some junior
draftsman in some engineering office says.
One needs to include specifically in the contract what should be ar-
bitrated. Everything else goes to litigation. On a commercial transporta-
tion agreement, not very many of which go to arbitration, I have seen the
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mechanisms set out for escalation clauses which specifically refer to arbi-
tration. In hotel management contracts, mainly in the pricing, if it is a
flat fee plus a percentage of revenues or percentage of net, where it is
essentially an accounting issue, we usually agree to arbitrate. But I
would not agree to arbitrate the general interpretation of a hotel manage-
ment agreement in Canada.
QUESTION, Mr. Ristau: Mr. Whitehill, I was fascinated by your refer-
ence to the new federal act allowing federal agencies to use new dispute
resolution machinery. As an ex-bureaucrat, I am mindful that the fed-
eral government has no authority to arbitrate. From time to time, some-
one would slip up and arbitrate, and the General Accounting Office
would not pay the arbitrator. Therefore, the government wound up with
a wonderful award which was ultimately unenforceable. There are two
decisions from the old court of claims saying that since the government
had no authority to arbitrate, the awards were unenforceable.
Under the new statute, do you happen to know if Congress is going
to apportion money for payment of arbitral awards against the United
States?
ANSWER, Mr. Whitehill: Yes, assuming that the award is binding.
There is a clause in the statute for questions of constitutionality concern-
ing whether or not the agency can agree to binding arbitration. There is
also a thirty day vacating clause. If it is not vacated by the agency, then
it becomes binding. Under the Federal Arbitration Act it can then be
entered into any court for enforcement. Of course, the agency is author-
ized to pay. Under the Act, expenses associated with the arbitration are
allowable expenses.
I do not think we will have any difficulty other than the question of
whether or not an agency may vacate the award. Clearly the act intends
that such will not be the usual procedure.
QUESTION, Mr. Fried: Where do you expect the line to be drawn, par-
ticularly in your industry, where health and safety regulation is impor-
tant? There will also be differences regarding how much additive is
adequate or inadequate in the FDA rule making. Do you see that type of
dispute following more on the public interest side or more on the ADR
side?
ANSWER, Mr. Whitehill: It is built into the statute whether or not the
decision is of some precedential value to many other interests. We have
many proceedings at the FDA, for instance, asking whether a new prod-
uct or ingredient may be added to the grass list, that is, generally ac-
cepted as safe. It may not really concern many companies, but there may
be one company that might join us in the petition. If there is a disagree-
ment, I do not see any reason why that should not be subject to ADR.
There can be other issues before the FDA that, obviously, will be of great
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interest to the entire population. But some of those can be taken care of
by having proper parties as part of the hearing.
QUESTION, Mr. Shanker: You said that all of your commercial arbi-
trations involve using three arbitrators. Is that your preference? Do you
see any advantage to three rather than one?
ANSWER, Mr. Whitehill: Usually the reason it is a panel of three is
simply because of the procedure of choosing the arbitrators, i.e., one
party chooses one, one party chooses another and a third is chosen as a
neutral. In a proper circumstance I do not see any reason why there
cannot be only one. In fact, there have been cases where two were used.
COMMENT, Ms. Braid: I have a preference for three arbitrators be-
cause the kind of matter that I usually arbitrate is often technical.
Frankly, I am going to appoint someone with the technical background
who I have a pretty good idea will agree with my point of view on what
the result should be. The other side is going to do the same thing. Then
between the two arbitrators, a middle-ground arbitrator is chosen. I
want someone who is sufficiently well known in his field, sufficiently dili-
gent and sufficiently thought of as being unbiased that his view is going
to carry a lot of weight with the middleman. On technical issues, I think
more than one point of view is useful. The neutral is also useful in asking
questions. Questions asked from the neutral often have more effect than
questions asked from your side of the table. If you are a member of the
arbitration panel, ask questions of the other side's experts. It is useful.
COMMENT, Mr. Whitehill: By the way, the bias is taken out of choos-
ing arbitrators under agencies such as the AAA, where you cannot ap-
point your arbitrator at random. You choose an arbitrator from a
neutral panel. If that arbitrator has any particular relationship to your
company, he is disqualified. Therefore, the panel of three, where one is
for one side and one is for the other, and the neutral is in between, is
really not the practice today.
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